Out of the Cellar Part Two: The Strategies for Change

Well, today we enter into Part Two of the new rambling rant known as “Out of the Cellar”—our venture into the Washington schools’ prospects for achieving upward mobility in the Pac-10 conference.

In Part One, we examined the conference ceiling. Today, we take a look at the basic strategies each program is employing to make their way back to respectability. And, we offer what we hope will be a somewhat balanced take on the potential efficacy of each approach. In our next installment, we give our final assessment of where we think both programs are headed.

And of course, when we refer to “we”, we’re talking about the Vince Grippi kind of “we”—i.e. “ME!”

Read on…..

Let’s start first with the University of Washington Defeateds.

Team: University of Washington
Basic Strategy: Become USC North.
Prospect for Realizing Strategy: Marginal
Rationale:

Before we talk about the Defeateds’ quest to become USC’s primary rival, it is important to first understand the underlying mechanics for what makes USC the type of dominant program it is. So, in order to be as clear as possible, I offer you the Coug-A-Sutra’s basic typology of player and program development.

(Type 1) Within Player Development. Every team depends on the growth and development of its players. The question is, what is the best way to get players to develop? Some schools depend on each player to become “the best they can be” irrespective of the quality of competition around them (sound familiar). Other schools develop individual players by virtue of challenging them to compete against talented others who are on the same team.

(Type 2) Within Program Development/Competition. This type of development occurs as a result of competition among players on the roster. The more depth you have on your roster, the more that other players in the program foster the development of other players within the program. When you are developing a program from the ground up, this type of development is difficult because there are such HUGE gaps between the 1’s, 2’s, and 3’s and the guys you’re going to be playing. In great programs, this type of development accelerates progress during the season and helps guard against within program complacency.

(Type 3) Between Program Development. This type of development occurs as the result of playing time and competition. Obviously, all schools (at least one would hope) get better by playing games. The distinction here is that HORRIBLE programs (like us last year) depend on playing games as their primary source of development because there is no one within the program that can push the starters. On the flip side, Great programs like SC get better and better as much through practice against themselves as they do playing against others.

With that all in mind, USC’s strategy is just about as straightforward as it is successful. First, they have put together schemes on both sides of the ball that translate well to the NFL. So, as USC recruits nationally to bring in players, they are able to hit recruits with a mountainous sales pitch: (1) We win—always have, always; (2) We send players to the NFL in droves; (3) If you’re good enough you’ll play right away; (4) LA is the greatest place ever to be a football player and star.

What that means for the progression of players within the USC program is basic: Their program is so darn stocked with depth, they force each player to constantly develop both physically and mentally through constant within program competition. And that’s one of the main reasons why they win. They literally are a self-sustaining NFL player development machine.

But the other reason why USC ALWAYS wins is not only because of scheme, but because of the frequency of opportunity to develop that scheme. Granted, when you have superior athletes, in some ways it doesn’t matter what scheme you have. In that same way, when you are faster than everyone else on the field, sometimes it doesn’t matter if you run the set play or not: if you’re open and if you create room for yourself in space, you find yourself in the zone. Period.

At the same time, it really is no accident about why it is that USC wins seemingly all of their bowl games by 40 points every year. Consider this:

1) When a team travels to a bowl game, they are granted 15 extra practices each year.
a. Teams get 29 pre-season practices each year.
b. Teams get 15 spring practices in each year.

So:

1) A fourth year junior in the USC program, has 45 more practices than a WSU or UW player (who has never been to a bowl game) in the same class. Translation: That is three more full sessions of spring ball–and that doesn’t even include differences in the quality of competition each player has played against along the way.

2) A fifth year senior in the USC program has 60 more practices than a WSU or UW player in the same class—and that’s before the season begins. By the end of their time in the program, a USC player over the past five years has participated in 75 more practices than a player at either Washington school. That’s six extra spring sessions and about two and half training camps.

As a result of playing that much more football, teams like SC that go to bowl games each year not only have more opportunities for player development and intra-program competition, they also have that much more time to learn their program’s schemes. What that means is that they have MORE time to develop talent, MORE time to develop their players, and MORE time to develop the scheme needed to EXECUTE their talent and program philosophy.

Now, as we’ve documented here before, the thing going FOR the UW is that Sark has been a part of helping that SC machine move itself forward. What he does NOT have is experience in doing what he has to do, at least in part, at Washington: Recruit AND develop the talent of individual players, potentially without sufficient depth to generate the type and frequency of intra-program competition he had at SC.

So, for Sark to succeed at the helm in Washington, he must, in my view, do the following things and do them quickly:

In essence, my view of Sark’s strategy is that he aims to get in enough bodies to win quickly so he can (a) Have a selling point for 4 star athletes to choose the U over more established programs; (b) get in those extra reps needed to do what he wants to do scheme wise to prepare his players both to win as well as enjoy careers in the NFL (which feedbacks to goal “a”).

Team: Washington State
Basic Strategy: Become Oregon State or Boise State North
Prospect for Realizing Strategy: Moderate
Rationale:
In contrast to Sark’s philosophy of developing the program through recruiting and within program competition, Wulff and Company are focused much more on within player development than anything else. And, for the benefit of Coug fans everywhere, they actually have experience in doing just that.

Although Wulff would ideally redshirt as many kids as possible is to build the type of depth needed to develop kids through within program competition, Wulff also knows that said luxury is rarely possible at a school like WSU.

Consequently, in recognition of this cold-hard-fact of Cougardome, Wulff has decided to respond to the consistent difficulty coaches have in recruiting kids to WSU by doing what his predecessor Bill Doba largely failed to do: respond to that difficulty by actually being SELECTIVE about the prospects targeted by the program.

While Doba and company often went after the “high talent” kid and got the leftovers, Wulff has targeted “character guys” in addition to a hidden gem or two (see Tuel as the most relevant example). You see, Wulff knows that character guys are the ones who can push themselves in spite of having few others to push them. In this way, Wulff views toughness not only as a way to out-scrap teams in close contests, he views toughness as the primary way of developing talent within the program at the same time the program lacks depth and experience.

So, if we were to represent Sarks approach to developing the Huskies as chain of dominos, we would see the following:

Conversely, Wulff’s Strategy is:

Ultimately, the success for both programs, depends on their success in getting the guys they want to sign up. That said, I happen to think that there is MORE pressure on Sark to win early and often than there is on Wulff. And that claim is based on my view that Sark has much more to work with–including a media darling quarterback who is now an upperclassmen.

So, for Sark to build on his token selling point that he is a winner–and for the Dawgs to climb out of the cellar–he’s gonna need to show that he’s a winner and quickly. That means he needs to get the Dawgs to a bowl game within his first two years. Absent a bowl game or a few big wins over his main competitors in recruiting (USC, Oregon, UCLA, and CAL), I don’t see how he gets the recruits he needs to be successful. I really don’t.

Meanwhile, Paul Wulff has a much more realistic set of expectations and a shallower development trajectory to deal with. The question is whether or not he can develop his heretofore bare cupboard quickly enough to keep the faith alive in Cougarville. If Wulff can continue to get his players to LOOK like Major College/NFL prospects and win a few games along the way, then his proven record in developing players without much within program competition will help him lead the program to the type of periodic success that will keep Coug fans both happy and interested.

So, there you have it. Two rival programs without many things in common on or off the field. In fact, just about the only thing they share in common are a strong and increasing dislike of each other as well as a giant mountain that both are going to have to scrap like hell to climb.

We’ll be back in a few with our prediction for how this will all end up over the coming years. Until then, please give us your thoughts and opinions. The season is only about week away.

With love,
Osho Rojo