Chris Grant’s firing suggests that there is more to rebuilding than tanking for draft talent.
It wasn’t supposed to go this way.
Not for a team, who four years ago watched the best player in the NBA leave for warmer climates, decided to tear it all down and start over, and lucked out twice in four years with the top pick in the draft, totaling four top five picks in three drafts. The rebuilding had commenced, but it was supposed to be over. Playoff aspirations echoed from players to management to fans. Finally it seemed, The Decision could be put behind them.
Yet at 17-33 and five games back from the 8th seed in the Eastern Conference, the Cleveland Cavaliers look nothing like a playoff team and have major concerns about their current roster and coaching staff. Following a 119-108 home loss to the Lakers on Wednesday, in which the Lakers were down to five players by the end of the game (and by technicality four with Robert Sacre fouled out), owner Dan Gilbert fired general manager Chris Grant. It may have been more a move to shake things up, but much of the Cavalier’s current roster is because of Grant’s decisions.
Let’s examine Grant’s major moves since he took over in 2010:
- Drafted Kyrie Irving #1 in 2011.
- Drafted Tristan Thompson #4 in 2011.
- In June of 2011, traded J.J. Hickson to Sacramento for Omar Casspi and a future 1st round pick.
- In March 2012, traded Christian Eyenga and Ramon Sessions to the Lakers for Luke Walton, Jason Kapono, 2012 and 2013 1st round picks.
- Drafted Dion Waiters #4 and Jared Cunningham #24 in the 2012 draft.
- Traded Cunningham along with Jae Crowder and Bernard James for Tyler Zeller and Kelenna Azubuike the day after the draft.
- In January 2013, traded Jon Leuer to the Grizzles for Marreese Speights, Wayne Ellington, Josh Selby, and a future 1st round pick.
- Drafted Anthony Bennett #1 in the 2013 draft.
- Drafted Sergey Karasev #19 in the 2013 draft.
- Signed Jarrett Jack, Andrew Bynum, and Earl Clark.
- Traded Bynum, a 2014 1st round pick, 2015 and ’16 2nd round picks, and the option to swap 2015 1st round picks with Chicago (if it falls between 15-30) for Luol Deng.
Most of the trades were made to acquire assets and picks. No free agent signings of note were made until this past summer, a telling sign of a team committed to drafting talent and letting it develop. The strategy appeared sound, and none of the players traded away for picks aside from maybe Hickson were worth keeping around.
Grant did a solid job of acquiring picks, and it worked out better than anyone anticipated considering they resulted in two #1s and two #4s, except this is where things went wrong. In every alternate dimension, the Cavaliers are taking Irving. After that it gets tricky. Thompson at #4 was a bit of reach, but he’s put up near double-double numbers the past two seasons. While upgradable, they could be doing far worse than Thompson starting at the four. One could make the case for picking Valanciunas instead, and even though his ceiling is higher, at this point Valanciunas wouldn’t be the difference maker for Cleveland being in the playoffs rather than out.
Then comes Waiters. Drafted for his scoring ability, he’s proved capable in that regard. However his attitude, fit with the roster, and reports that he may or may not have punched Irving in the face have the Cavaliers considering trade offers. And then comes Bennett, who may fall victim to simply being taken too high. The month of February has been positive; Bennett is averaging 8.8 points and 4.8 rebounds in four games, suggesting he may be turning a corner. The issue of course is that he was taken with the first pick, and aside from his recent play he has been outright dreadful.
So the team focused primarily on drafting future talents, and as it stands those picks have resulted in one All-Star, a solid starter, and two players who causing more harm than good. Combine that with three free agent signings that all backfired, a midseason trade for a Luol Deng that could end up being a half season rental, and the difficult adjustment players are having to Mike Brown’s system, we can see why things haven’t worked out. Grant may have missed on at least half of these picks, but he also picked during three less than stellar drafts (particular the 2013 draft). Really, the issue isn’t necessarily who Cleveland drafted but rather the timing of the rebuild.
There seems to have been this assumption (shared by me mind you) that Cleveland would tank for two or three seasons and then decide, “Okay, time to make the playoffs” and that is proving more difficult than anyone imagined (A lot of this is talked about in our latest podcast, and I encourage you all to give it a listen). Tanking, or rather the decision by a front office to put an inferior product on the floor, has become the thing of late among every franchises looking to rebuild. Create cap space, draft and develop, and don’t lock yourself down with big contracts. Every team looks at OKC’s model and aspires to do the same thing, but I’m beginning to wonder if they are the outlier in an otherwise poorly structured plan of building a championship. Improving through the draft is essential, particularly for small market teams, but when a team puts so much stock into draft picks it leaves little room for error. If no free agent signings of substance are made during that time, a team can find themselves thin.
I think Cleveland had a solid strategy, but it went wrong with an assemblance of draft selections and free agent signings that aren’t fitting together, which suggests building a playoff team is more than acquiring talent. Teams need to decide what kind of team they are going to be (in terms of both offensive and defensive strategies) and commit to players who they believe would fit that system. Often we hear the phrase, “Take the best player available” which in some cases is the best move, but if said player isn’t going to work in a team’s system it may be better to draft the guy who will. In free agency, the same rule applies. Detroit is discovering signing a big name free agent isn’t going to solve their problems if he doesn’t work with the rest of the roster. Cleveland is experiencing more of the same; Jack doesn’t work well next to Irving since both players need the ball in their hands and don’t play well off of it. Earl Clark was brought in to play small forward (which he struggles to do), and Bynum proved unable to be the productive player the team was hoping for. Since acquiring Deng, his numbers are down. On paper the talent is there, but the pieces don’t fit.
So heed the warning signs in Cleveland, all you NBA general managers (and couch GMs). Rebuilding by tanking has its potential positives, but it is a risky strategy if the wrong picks are made or the players don’t fit. Rebuilding with a team identity in mind (and sticking to that identity) may in fact be the safer route.
They say mediocrity is the worst place to be in the NBA, but I’m not so sure. During Indiana’s most recent rebuild, the Pacers never lost more than 35 games. Paul George, their franchise player, was selected 10th. Their second best player Roy Hibbert went 17th. Lance Stephenson? 40th. The rest of their rotation (David West, Luis Scola, George Hill, and CJ Watson) came via trades or free agency. Point being, there are other forms of rebuilding beyond tanking that can create championship contenders, and it doesn’t have to be at the expense of losing a large amount of games.
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