Breaking Up the Gang: Why Ty Van Burkleo Should be Removed

Personally, I have never been on to reach for a scape goat or ask for the head of a coach of any kind. In general, the players on the field are responsible for their own actions and when some coaches in recent Indians history have been let go, I have thought it was too early or unnecessary, particularly in the case of the architect of the bullpen mafia, Scott Radinsky. That being said, there are times when a change is necessary and coming into a season with an offense expected to be among the best in baseball that actually produces among the worst is a perfect time to look into the actual effectiveness of a batting coach.

It is extremely difficult to see the effects of any particular coach or manager separate from that of the players on the field. There are random variations bigger than the effect of any one person in addition to the yearly growth and depreciation of players. Even so, we can attempt to make some sense of the situation, with and without traditional stats.

Starting with the obscure, the above table shows the Indians swing rate on balls inside (Z-Swing%) and outside (O-Swing%) behind the last two hitting coaches, Van Burkleo since 2013 and Bruce Fields the year and a half prior (he took over half way through 2011 for Jon Nunnally). I think is a particularly relevant part of the hitting coaches effect on the team as it has to do with a player’s game plan going into an at bat and their ability to identify pitches within and without the zone.

Largely thanks to Carlos Santana, Jason Kipnis and Michael Brantley, the Indians have had one of the best rates of avoiding swings at outside the zone pitches. Since 2011, the Indians have ranked fourth, first, second, sixth and first in all of baseball in this rate, showing that they at least aren’t wasting at bats by swinging at junk pitches. This year is directly in line with the previous seasons with similar offensive players as is the 61.5% rate within the strike zone. In any even, this is less than two percent different from the year before.

I haven’t really gotten into traditional stats at this point because of their variability and because it should go without saying that the Indians are having major issues this season. The chart to the right shows the Indians runs per game over the past few seasons including a break down of this season by month. In addition to scoring slightly less than the previous four years overall this season, in June, the Indians have hit a new low at just 2.8 runs per game including four shut outs, four one run games and five two run games. Their record in those games in June was 3-10, with the three wins being more surprising than the ten losses. Essentially this has put the team in a place where they have to win when they do score more than four runs as the chances are it won’t happen often.

Another look into a batter’s preparation heading into an at bat is the type of swing he takes. We have established that the Indians are good at discerning strikes and balls, but how do they attack the pitches they do decide to swing at? I looked into this situation particularly with runners in scoring position last week from the player’s standpoint, particularly Michael Bourn and Santana, but for a more accurate look at the hitting coach, we need to see how the whole team has performed, remembering that Van Burkleo took over prior to the 2013 season.

Here again we have a chart showing very similar numbers from year to year with the exception of the final line. Here is where the hitting coach comes into play as there seems to be a lack of a plan going into at bats with runners in scoring position. It may not be fair, but Santana is again the perfect example. While he has a solid, patient, wait for the ball and react approach with none on, he appears to change completely with runners in scoring position. Below are his actual rate stats compared to a player who seems to maintain the same approach in all at bats, David Murphy.

While both batters have worse numbers in clutch situations, Murphy’s steady approach has at least lead to a respectable line. The most telling number of all, however is that Carlos Santana has hit an infield fly ball in a full 25% of his chances with runners in scoring position. Based on personal observations in addition to the stats, I believe this is because he is launching off his back foot, attempting to time his swing perfectly to crush a home run every time runners are on. With this strategy, he has to guess the type, location and speed of the pitch prior to it being thrown in order to be successful. Since he has such great plate discipline, he has still been able to take walks in this situation, but if he is just slightly wrong in his prediction, he ends up swinging and earning an unfortunate result.

While Santana has been used as the example, he is not the only one with this and other problems leading into at bats. Bourn, Yan Gomes, Lonnie Chisenhall, Jose Ramirez and Brandon Moss have all had worse seasons so far this year than previously and a lot of that could stem from a poor plate approach. Others who are having good years, like Jason Kipnis, Michael Brantley and Murphy can’t be credited to Van Burkleo as it is more the responsibility of the hitting coach to fix those who aren’t hitting well than to maintain those who are.

There are two ways in which Ty Van Burkleo could be failing as an instructor. Either he is giving the players incorrect information or the players are not using the help he is offering. Either way (the latter is more likely) without a change in heart in the veterans on this team, particularly Bourn, Santana and Moss, there can be no turn around in offensive strategy. It is completely possible that he is a great strategist, but if he cannot get his players to listen to him, that is completely irrelevant.

Less than an argument for his definite removal, this is more a request to question if there could be a solution. There is one more addition to this possibility and that has two parts, how have players fared once joining or leaving his presence and a possible successor. The answer to both of these questions can be found on the chart below.

Assuming AAA pitching has remained the same distance from MLB hitting all year, you would expect hitters to have similar differences between the Majors and the highest minor league level. This hasn’t been the case. The two players who were working with Van Burkleo, but went on to work with Rouglas Odor in Columbus have had huge differences between their MLB and AAA performances, while the two players who started with Odor, then were promoted have seen very slim losses between their AAA and MLB production. Other than simple luck (which is possible with such a small sample size), the easiest explanation of this is that Giovanny Urshela and Francisco Lindor have carried their offensive strategy learned at the hands of Odor to the Majors, while Chisenhall and Ramirez have benefited from a new tutor.

Even if this is not the case and that it is the rookies being more willing to listen to Van Burkleo than the “veterans” Chisenhall, Ramirez, Bourn and Santana, it makes no difference. The Indians need a coach who the veterans respect, whether that is Odor, Jason Giambi or someone else, it certainly doesn’t appear to be Van Burkleo.