The modern era of baseball has been completely redefined by a statistical revolution, providing much more accurate analysis of what is actually happening on the field from an all encompassing view down to the smallest detail. Unfortunately, even with these stats making analysis an option for every viewer, fans still fall into the same old pitfalls of bandwagon jumping. Similar to how players have been labeled as “clutch” in the past for no reason other than having more RBI opportunities than other players, some now are placing too much emphasis on single stats, like UZR or WAR, without using all the available information. One victim of this practice is the Cleveland Indians starting second baseman, Jason Kipnis.
Prior to recent defensive metrics, Kipnis would have been considered an excellent fielder. In Indians history, he ranks second in fielding percent (.985) behind just Roberto Alomar of second basemen with at least 400 games played at the position. Even considering a newer, although less comprehensive stat in range factor, Kipnis has been near the league average (4.64) over his career at 4.55 plays per nine innings. Despite being comparable in some ways to a ten time Gold Glove winner and largely thanks to his -5.6 career UZR/150 and a social media avalanche, Kipnis is considered such a poor defender that it is becoming a popular opinion to ask for his removal from the infield, possibly sending him back to the outfield.
While I recently expounded the values of expansive stats, such as UZR, there is a danger in placing too much faith in any one stat, no matter what that is. In fact, just because new stats exist that are better at evaluating players doesn’t mean the old are useless. Fielding percent is simply the percent of plays a fielder completes successfully that they get to. Rounding up, Kipnis completes essentially 99% of plays he attempts. This is a huge starting point as second base is a very difficult position and even some of the greatest Indians of all time like Carlos Baerga (.974), Joe Gordon (.975), Nap Lajoie (.965) and light hitting defensive specialist Duane Kuiper (.984) were unable to reach that 99% level. In 2014 specifically, Kipnis posted a .989 fielding percent, good enough for second in the American League among those with at least 600 innings played (behind Dustin Pedroia who had an unbelievable .997), a number that could have made him a Gold Glove winner a few decades ago.
Obviously, there is more to defense than making the easy plays, but at these Kipnis is as proficient as any player in the league now and in Indians history. Another way at separating plays by their ease is with FanGraphs’ Inside Edge Fielding. This is a newly recorded stat which breaks down plays into six different types and tracks a player’s efficiency at completing those plays. Again, it is obvious that Kipnis is excellent at fielding the easiest of plays. While this may seem obvious, AL second basemen ranged from completing 99.8% of these (Pedroia again) to just 96.9% (Gordon Beckham) and Kipnis again finished near the top, completing 98.6%. Kipnis also ranks in the top half of AL second basemen on slightly difficult plays (called likely and expected to be made 60-90% of the time) by completing 75% of those plays. Where Kipnis fails is on those plays that a normal second baseman would not make the play, but an excellent one would. On even plays (should be made 40-60% of the time) and unlikely (from 10-40%), Kipnis is among the worst in the league, completing 42.9% and 10.5% respectively.
Kipnis’ UZR tells the same tale, although more comprehensibly, making fans who don’t look any deeper think he is a poor fielder. UZR includes range (Kipnis was worth -16.6 runs in 2014), double play ability (-4 runs) and fielding proficiency (saved 3.2 runs above average) and since he has such a diminished range, it eliminates his excellent ability to turn balls hit at him into outs. This is similar to how Lonnie Chinsehall’s -1.5 dWAR almost completed wiped out his impressive 3.1 oWAR in 2014. Both players have an obvious skill and with proper use, could be of even more value to their team.
In the case of Kipnis, the answer may be a combination of a strategy popularized a few years ago in Cleveland by Ronnie Belliard and a trend currently taking over baseball’s infields. Many insulted Belliard’s defense because he was a little larger than the average 2B and played deeper, but by playing deep, he vastly improved his range, ultimately leading to a positive 6.2 UZR/150 while with the Indians. There is no question that Belliard was not as good at fielding balls as Kipnis is now, but simply by playing a few feet deeper, he was able to be a better overall defender.
In a similar vein is the current trend of shifting. According to the Wall Street Journal back in September, the Indians shifted more than all but seven other teams, moving around the infielders drastically depending on the batter 707 times by September 9th. In these instances, they stopped 17 more hits that would have otherwise went through than they cost themselves. While there is a range of effectiveness in using defensive shifts, they are something the Indians could use more often to shore up the defense as a whole. The video below is a perfect example.
[mlbvideo id=”35548911″ width=”400″ height=”224″ /]
If this particular contact had been made with Kipnis playing a typical second base position, it would have been a single to center (counting in the impossible range for Kipnis on the Inside Edge scale), but instead, being in the right place at the right time allowed him to make the difficult play. While shifts have been around for decades, they became much more extreme and greater in number in 2014 and will likely continue to grow in 2015. Placing fielders in the most likely place that the ball will be hit, gives them the greatest chance to make the play and if a ball is hit directly to a fielder, there is no person the Indians would rather have field it than Jason Kipnis. It may be a bit of experiment, but there is a chance the Indians could eliminate almost all of Kipnis’ range issues and accentuate his play making ability by simply playing him a little deeper and shifting around more often. While the pitching staff still has to work on pitching into the shift, these changes could go a long way into changing one of the worst overall defenders in the American League into a possible Gold Glover.
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