Welcome to Second Guessing Scioscia, our look back at some of the questionable decisions that Mike Scioscia made in the last week. And, boy, there are some questionable decisions to be reviewed. In the history of this column, we have never once struggled for content. However, we aren’t anti-Scioscia. The official MWAH stance on Scioscia is pro-Scioscia overall. But his in-game tactics need some help and we are here to provide that help by nitpicking incessantly and grading them with our patented SciosciaFace grading system.
In this week’s edition of Second Guessing Scioscia we take a look at Scioscia’s bullpen blunder in a playoff-like atmosphere, which if you think about it, is what Scioscia usually does in the playoffs.
I’m over the over managing
Oh, Scioscia, what are we going to do with you? It seems like every time the Angels have a playoff or playoff-like game, you have to put your big, fat nose right into the middle of everything and muck it all up. There is just something that goes off in his head in these big games that tells him, “OK, Sosh, let’s manage the fuck out of this shit!”
Yes, in the ninth inning of Thursday’s game, Scioscia decided to make the game all about how smart he thinks he is. He thought he was going to manage circles around the Astros but he instead managed himself right to the edge of the cliff and flung himself off it.
In the ninth inning of Thursday’s game, the smart, easy and sensible thing to do in that scoreless tie would’ve been to bring in Huston Street. But no, Scioscia had to try and be clever. This wasn’t a case of the old school manager saving his closer for a potential save that may never come, Sosh has a record of not falling into that trap. No, this was just classic overthinking.
Instead of bringing in Huston Street, he brought in Jose Alvarez. Alvarez is arguably the worst reliever on the active roster, already making this a shaky decision. Jose isn’t terrible, but there are clearly superior talents available. Heck, there is even a better reliever lefty available in Cesar Ramos.
The reason a lefty mattered was because Luis Valbuena and Colby Rasmus were due up. Both are lefty bats that are very susceptible to same-side pitching. You can see Scioscia’s logic there and it isn’t entirely faulty. Why burn Street against two batters who could be easily neutralized by a lesser reliever? That allows Scioscia to save Street for a more dangerous part of the lineup or, so I thought at the time, to come in and bail out Alvarez should it become necessary. I’m not saying it is the smart thing to do here, but I see the logic.
Even giving Scioscia that benefit of the doubt, the choice of Alvarez over Ramos was quite curious. Ramos is just better. That’s why he is the one that usually gets the higher leverage work. Neither player is exactly death on lefties, but neither is particularly vulnerable to righties, which is important since switch-hitting Jed Lowrie, who is actually more dangerous against southpaws, was sandwiched between Valbuena and Rasmus. Ramos was certainly well rested enough, so for the choice of Alvarez over Ramos, I can offer no real defense.
That choice wasn’t one I would call a mortal offense though. Where Scioscia really went wrong was when he replaced Alvarez. The original Alvarez decision was somewhat understandable because he could always pull the ripcord and bring in Street if things got hairy. Instead, he brought in Fernando Salas who is to high leverage situations what Donald Trump is to civilized political discourse.
Salas has been on a roll of late, but is no Huston Street and this was no time to be screwing around. This is a huge game that is no officially in peril. Bring in Street for a four-out appearance and give yourself a chance at winning. This is an easy call, but somehow Sosh whiffed on it.
His true sin, as it so often is, is playing NOT to lose rather than playing to win. That’s what bringing in Salas and it is also why Scioscia had his outfield playing deep against Marwin Gonzalez. The outfield was in the classic “no doubles” alignment, also known as the “allow easy singles” defense. Guess what? Known powerhouse Marwin Gonzalez doinked what should have been a soft liner to center that should’ve been an easy out to end the inning into an inning-extending single. Scioscia is following conventional wisdom here, so it is hard to be too mad. However, the contrast is quite stark against Houston, a team who is at the forefront of defensive positioning strategy and seldom ever plays the “no doubles” defense.
At this point, Scioscia has already made his bed with Salas. He can either leave him in to face Castro or bring in Ramos to face him. Here, I give Scioscia a pass because the most likely outcome of bringing in Ramos is Conger pinch-hitting instead. What I don’t give Scioscia a pass for is the actual reason he gave for not bringing in Ramos. Via the LA Times:
“Being a little short in the bullpen, we wanted to see if Fernando could get out of that and possibly start the next inning,” Scioscia said. “We had a lot of confidence in Fernando. He’s been throwing the ball well of late. He missed with one spot.”
Explain to me how it is the Angels were short? Yes, Smith, Alvarez and Salas were all used at this point, but Gott, Ramos, Street and Rasmus were all available and all reasonably well-rested. Honestly, that sounds to me like the lamest possible excuse given all for the sake of publicly shaming the front office into trading for another bullpen arm. What it is in reality is once again Scioscia managing not to lose. He didn’t want to use Ramos because he was worried about using three relievers in one inning in a game that might go several more innings. Emphasis on “might.” What Scioscia, as always, fails to grasp in this situation is that there is no sense in worrying about who might pitch in the 15th inning if you can’t figure out how to make it out of the ninth inning alive.
Scioscia lost sight of that and, as a direct result, the Angels lost the game.
VERDICT:
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