When you out manage the eventual world champion manager, expect to be rewarded.
On Friday, the Cleveland Indians exercised the 2019 and 2020 clubs options on the contract for Terry Francona. This action came as no surprise, after Francona took the club to its first World Series since 1997 and was within one win of taking home the title, before losing a dramatic Game 7 to the Chicago Cubs. The Indians were 94-67, winning the AL Central Division and the AL Pennant. Francona has taken the club to the playoffs twice in his four seasons, with 2016 being his best showing. He’s never finished below .500 while managing the team and won AL Manager of the Year in 2013.
Francona’s work in the postseason and World Series in particular, was a form of art work that will be studied for years to come. It nearly brought the city of Cleveland its first World Series championship since 1948.
The Cubs and Indians were a mismatch on-paper. FiveThirtyEight’s prediction model estimated the Cubs as 63 percent favorites to win the series, while CBS’ simulations gave them 59 percent and Vegas set the line at -175 in their favor. Chicago, after all, beats Cleveland in almost all aspects of the game; starting rotation depth, defense, bench options, power hitting and 100-year curses to banish.
In Cleveland’s favor were two extremely effective relievers, in Andrew Miller and Cody Allen, and one of the league’s best starting pitchers in Corey Kluber. Francona’s challenge was to combine his strengths into a winning formula even as his opponent had many potential advantages. If he could get three wins out of Kluber and one from anybody else, the series was his. The trade-off came in knowing that his best players would become unavailable even in close games when the Indians fell behind.
The logic behind this selective usage is easy. Let’s say, in a simple example, that every inning Miller pitches increases the odds of Cleveland winning by 10 percent. Over the course of two games, Francona could use him in three basic ways: primarily to help when behind, primarily to help when ahead, or without any regard for how the team is playing. In addition, he could choose to give Miller a larger number of one-inning outings or a smaller number of two-inning outings.
A strategy that concentrates Francona’s best players in winning efforts might require a certain prior chance of winning to pull the trigger on using the big lefty. For example, using him for two innings in a game to get the team’s chances from 10% to 30% would probably not be as useful to Francona, under this formula, as getting the team from a 60% to an 80% chance of winning one game. Francona went to Miller largely along this line of thought in Cleveland’s wins in games 1, 3 and 4.
In Game 1, Miller entered in the seventh up three runs and got six outs (+.146 Win Probability Added). In Game 3, he entered in the fifth in a scoreless game and got four outs (+.120 WPA). Allen was also called upon for four outs of work (+.263 WPA). In Game 4, Miller entered in the seventh up six and got six outs (+.014 WPA). Although the decision to use Miller in the seventh was reasonable given that the Indians were only up three runs heading into the top half of the inning, when he started warming, perhaps Francona could have saved an inning of work by having someone else pitch the eighth.
In contrast, Cleveland’s losses provoked a different approach. Games 2, 5 and 6 forced Tito to concede relatively early knowing he would have a tough time winning and that he might be better off conserving his most precious resources. Francona knew he had long odds in Game 2 with Trevor Bauer facing Jake Arrieta. With the Tribe down 2-0 and Bauer laboring in the top of the fourth with two outs, Zach McAllister came in to stop the bleeding instead of Miller. Francona passed on Miller again in Game 5 when he took Bauer out early, even though the Indians were only down two runs again. Game 6, meanwhile, was such a blowout early on that Cleveland’s management decisions became pretty straightforward.
Worse, the invincible Miller was human for the first time all postseason, too, surrendering four hits in a relief appearance for the first time in five years. The game plan fell apart. Most ironic of all, the effect of Francona’s management approach was that he prompted a drastic change in Maddon’s own strategy in the second half of the series. Maddon, with his club on the brink of losing everything, threw Aroldis Chapman in for an eight-out save in Game 5. Chapman had that same workload in Games 1 through 4, combined.
Maddon followed it up with a Game 6 that had his closer working in the seventh inning with a 7-2 lead. Chapman worked into the ninth inning of that game, by which point the Cubs had a seven-run lead and essentially a 100 percent win probability. In back-to-back elimination games, Maddon panicked at the first sign of trouble and called on his stopper. Chapman’s heavy burden in those games no doubt adds scrutiny to Maddon’s continued aggressive use in Game 7. It cost Chicago a lead and a smooth close to the historic series. So, instead, Mike Montgomery got the final out in the 10th vs. Mike Martinez with the tying run on base.
In the end, a game of maneuver became a grueling attrition battle. Still, Francona left a blueprint for underdog teams in future World Series. Even if your club is missing key players due to injury, even if your starting rotation isn’t very deep, and even if your opponent is stacked with exciting talent, there might still be a way to combine your assets in a best-of-seven clash. All it takes is a well-rested Andrew Miller and, like Chicago had for once in its franchise history, a bit of luck.
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