Today, as Bob McKenzie announced the Oilers had elevated Bob Green to a position “overseeing all scouting,” several twitterites, myself included, had a lengthy conversation about how to audit a scouting department.
I written variously about this topic before (here, here and here).
My two main points of contention were the following:
1. As satisfying as a “fire em all” attitude may be, firing the entire Oilers’ pro and amateur scouting staff (currently sitting at 19 persons) would be misguided for a variety of reasons.
As impossible as it may seem to many Oilers’ fans, it is unlikely all 19 scouts are worthy of termination. But, more importantly, it is unlikely such a whimsical decision will lead to success down the road.
2. We don’t really know–from outside the organization–who’s in charge of what and what mandates those in positions of responsibility have been given from above.
2009 appears to me as a “mandate watershed” moment for the organization. The Oilers’ spent top 100 picks on the likes of Cam Abney. It’s unclear how long after 2009 it took for the Oilers to clue in, but under MacTavish the team has set down a new mandate:
We’ve reshaped what our drafting philosophy is and worked extensively with Stu to identify the types of players we’re after in the later rounds. We’re after impact players.
Regardless of what you think of this mandate or its execution under MacTavish’s watch (hint: not much), it seems pretty clear that management has had a non-trivial impact on the Oilers’ draft record. The number of wild “reach” picks inside the top 100 since 2009 is down to basically null. The number of useless pugilists taken post-2009 is down to Drew Czerwonka (6th round 2010).
The question here is simple: If management sets a niche priority (size, positional need, etc.), how much responsibility do they bear for the results at the draft table?
We also know that management and/or ownership intervened in the drafting of Nail Yakupov first overall in 2012.
This occasions the question of trust (if you don’t trust your scouts to compile your draft list, why have them?) and responsibility (if management and/or ownership is ultimately responsible for calling out the names at the draft table and appear to meddle with the draft lists, don’t they bear responsibility for the picks?).
The thrust of both of these points of contention is simply that prior to making any personnel decisions, the Oilers must clearly resolve where fault lies. It is hoped that the on-going “forensic audit” is doing just that. I wrote about this process here.
The Forensic Audit: Scouting
Alan Hull, of CoppernBlue, has written a very good piece echoing some of my own thinking on the matter. I don’t have much to add. It’s great. Read it here.
Alan’s position is essentially the following: everyone should be audited, basically they should re-interview for their job and be prepared to argue their draft lists since 2007. I don’t have any problem with this position. It is essentially my own.
In the remainder of this article, I’m going to respond to a few things Alan brings up and make a few suggestions to supplement and/or modify Alan’s ideas.
~Alan writes:
Of course “Some” time is required in this evaluation, and I’m sure Rom will respond to clarify how much he feels is necessary
I don’t myself have a timeline. My basic position (outlined here), is that the moment you lose confidence in someone, they should be let go, or at the very least made to fight for their job. Given that the Oilers have publicly outed their scouting staff, it seems absurd to me that more action has yet to be taken. But, then, a lot about the Oilers is absurd.
The Oilers can’t have it both ways. They can’t trash their staff and continue to employ them. They have to either re-commit to their staff under new terms, or get on with a substantial change in personnel. Right quick.
~Alan places a fair amount of onus on the scouts to push for talent regardless of team mandate. I think this is a fair point. One can certainly hope that a scout will have an eye for talent and the courage of his convictions to push back against a boss requesting meat-mallets.
However, I’m not sure how realistic this is in practice. An organizational philosophy can create soft and hard pressures to conform. And, ultimately scouts don’t get the privilege of calling out the names on draft day. If your GM says, “I’m not interested in this list of undersized skill players. Who’s your top ‘assertive’ defenseman?” all you can reasonably do is try to find the best player meeting that criteria and argue the virtues of other players as best you can.
~Alan asks a really important question: “Was it the best selection given the information available at the time?”
I think we tend to do a lot of misguided post hoc criticizing of draft records. The truth of the matter is that the vast majority of draft picks outside of the first round fail to become NHL players (Scott Cullen used 100 games played as a marker here). It is important that we evaluate draft picks after the fact with two things in mind:
a) was the pick reasonable at the time? i.e., was it within the range of the publicly available lists (the gold standard being Bob McKenzie’s)?
b) picks need to be evaluated against the historic success rate for that round, not against isolated examples.
Too often we hold up a singular late round draft hit from another team as evidence of the success of one scouting department and the failure of another. This isn’t a sound model of evaluation.
~Alan doesn’t mention injury, but I assume it merely slipped his mind. The point here is obvious. A pick lost to injury doesn’t signify a scout’s failure any more than a pick lost to a poor development process.
~As I’ve mentioned elsewhere (here), I think we should consider (especially with late round picks) more indicators of scouting success, i.e., player success in other leagues.
A player who has a long, successful career in the KHL is clearly a better talent than a player who busts out of the ECHL. Neither player has an impact on the NHL team that scouted and drafted him. However, the scout that found the KHL player clearly has a stronger eye for talent. Any evaluation process should take this into account and not be NHL-myopic.
~Just as I wonder about the influence of management on scouts, I wonder about the influence of scouts on management. In the 2014 draft something very curious happened.
MacGregor: Frederic Chabot involved in Keven Bouchard pick He had to “fight with” MacT to get the two Gs taken http://t.co/exLZ0c8WBJ
— Romulus’ Apotheosis (@RomulusNotNuma) June 28, 2014
I’d like any forensic audit to get to the bottom of this. Why was Chabot scouting Bouchard? Why was Stu MacGregor dictating to MacTavish about holes in the organizational depth chart at goalie? Why was MacGregor so insistent on two goalies? Why not one? Why in a year when the Oilers were already short on picks and they left clear talent on the table (Spencer Watson, Edgars Kulda, Vladimir Tkachev, etc.), did they pursue two goalies? One of whom is a highly suspect as a prospect?
~For the reader’s reference, here’s two good looks the actual Oilers’ personnel involved:
From Lowetide, a look back at the 2012-13 draft and summary of the scouts involved.
And, from RexLibris, a 2013 look back at where the Oilers have been drafting from and where they’ve found success.
~For the love of god fire Bob Brown.
Stu MacGregor: “(Scout) Bob Brown had an extreme passion for him [Cam Abney].
MacGregor cites G scout Dave Heitz on the Zachary Nagelvoort pick https://t.co/ChRQqSL898 Bob Brown (and others) on Liam Coughlin
— Romulus’ Apotheosis (@RomulusNotNuma) June 28, 2014
Don’t wait. There’s enough evidence. Man.
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