Blowing in from Chicago: The Chicago Model, What is it?

Chicago’s Past

The Chicago Model had never been deployed quite as radically by Quenneville until the 2013-14 season. However, you can clearly see over the previous four seasons that Quenneville has a long relationship with this deployment model.

Chicago 09-10, 10-11

2011-12; 12-13

(note, extraskater does not have data for the 2009-10 season, so I’ve used a usage chart from the excellent Rob Vollman)

Again, these are just the forwards. And, in each case, I’ve marked the center tasked with the defensive responsibilities. While in these charts we don’t see the kind of “everyone on one side, except one line on the other” split, or the extreme nature of the split (c. 40-45% difference in 2013-14), we can still make out the theme.

Antecedents and Analogues

Parallel to the creative inventions of Quenneville to throttle the old guard of “checking, defensive hockey,” another man has been thinking along the same lines. Way out west, Alain Vigneault, while coaching the Vancouver Canucks employed a very similar strategy with center Manny Malholtra as the archetype of the Kruger role.

Canucks 2010-11; 11-12

Here, again, you can see the extreme disparity in zone starts. In fact, for the Malholtra/Vigneault years (10-12), the spread from Malholtra in the defensive zone (c. 12-24%) to the Sedins in the offensive zone (c. 75%) is c. 50-60%, substantially greater than the Kruger-Toews spread. The same basic philosophy is at work here: one line tasked with heavy defensive zone work, freeing up offensive players to optimize their talents. In both cases, also, you can see the coach making up for zone starts with quality of competition.

The difference between Vigneault and Quenneville is in how they use the middle of their rosters. Whereas Quenneville is content to let it ride (everyone but Kruger’s line starts way up stream), Vigneault insulates himself somewhat by keeping a raft of players (the Kesler line essentially) right in the middle of the action.

Interestingly, the year before Vancouver acquired Malholtra, Vigneault looks like he tried to impose his strategy on a much lesser center (Ryan Johnson). Here’s a usage chart for the 2009-10 season:

Unsurprisingly, Vigneault brought his usage philosophy with him to the New York Rangers this season. In New York, he ran it with a pair of centers, Brian Boyle and Dominic Moore.

Rangers 2013-14

More surprising, however, is how the acquisition of Malhotra affected the usage of the Carolina Hurricanes roster. Here’s the usage chart for the Canes for 2012-13 (without Malholtra) and for 2013-14 (with Malholtra).

Both Cane teams were coached by Kirk Muller. Yet, from year to year, we witness a radical change in deployment strategy. In the 12-13 season, Muller has Jordan Staal in the role of defensive center (with 46.5% zone starts). But, in the 13-14 season he has Malholtra way back in Hoth, his apparently natural element (c. 21% zone starts).

So, the Chicago Model isn’t entirely novel. It does have champions around the league.

The Oilers… Can they Pull it Off?

As quoted above, it is clear that MacTavish envisions (long term at least) the Oilers following the Chicago Model (or some permutation of it, perhaps not unlike the variation Vigneault employs).

Indeed, based on coach Dallas Eakins’ usage of the Oilers last year, we can see that the team is already moving in that direction.

Of all the NHL forwards to play at least 62 games, Boyd Gordon had the toughest zone starts in 2013-14, just 17.8%. Based on MacTavish’s public comments and some of his off-season moves (acquiring scoring depth on the wings in Teddy Purcell and Benoit Pouliot), it is clear Gordon is in for more of the same.

The Oilers, in the not too distant future, are going to try and run three scoring lines off the hard defensive zone work of Gordon and his linemates (you’ll note Gordon was basically on his own in Hell until MacTavish found him a willing partner in Matt Hendricks).

Two palpable obstacles stand in the way of the Oilers’ succeeding by way of this model.

1. The general lack of depth all through the lineup, especially up the middle and on defence (which we haven’t addressed at all in this piece, but clearly a mobile defensive unit has a lot to do with getting the puck out of the defensive zone after those own-zone draws).

2. The Gazdic Cage. The Oilers seem bound and determined to play Luke Gazdic in the NHL. And, he is likely to play on the 4th line currently earmarked for Gordon &. Co. I’ve addressed this problem before. Simply put, Gazdic is a sink hole for any team trying to get the puck out of their own end.

The one glimmer of hope the Oilers have is in the Bollig comparison. Somehow the noted witch Marcus Kruger managed to drag Bollig into the black. Can Gordon do the same for Gazdic?

I’ll leave that as an open question and merely note that I have serious doubts that the Oilers’ roster as currently constructed can run this model without serious problems. Replacing Gazdic with Daniel Winnik would go a long way to boosting my confidence.

Too Many Charts, What’s Important?

There are really two key elements to the Chicago Model.

1. Roster Construction. You have to build a team without pluggers, scrubs, energy-players, etc. You need three bona fide scoring lines. Lines that can produce offence when given the opportunity, but also that can keep the play in the offensive end when they start there. They have to be able to maintain possession of the puck.

But, the understated key is that all important defensive center, the Marcus Kruger player. Without this guy, you are sunk.

2. Deployment Philosophy. You have to abandon the stale ideas of defensive hockey and grind/energy hockey and embrace offence and possession. And, you have to enable these new ideas with a crack center capable of playing through Hoth-like conditions.